Roots Party Plan For a Sovereign Aluminium Industry Under Worker Control

A Syndicalist Proposal for Aughinish Alumina and a New Public Smelter on the Shannon Estuary

1. The Crisis and the Political Choice

Aughinish Alumina, one of Europe’s largest refineries, faces forced closure under EU sanctions on its Russian owner, Rusal. The plant directly sustains approximately 800 skilled jobs.  450 staff and 300–400 permanent contractors as well as supporting an estimated 2,000–3,000 indirect and induced jobs concentrated in West Limerick, North Kerry, and Clare. It contributes €5–7 million annually in commercial rates to Limerick City and County Council, anchors Shannon Foynes Port’s bulk cargo operations, and has built a 40-year cluster of heavy industrial expertise. Its closure would be an act of regional devastation with no near-term remedy.

Simultaneously, the State is actively facilitating the allocation of 800 MW of electricity grid capacity to Amazon Web Services for data centres via a renewable supply agreement with Bord Na Mona. That capacity, roughly 6 TWh per year, is equivalent to the electricity consumption of 75% of Irish households at least, with a planned gas plant to supply Amazon with an additional 600MW. The Amazon facilities will generate minimal permanent employment relative to their energy footprint, add little to domestic supply chains, and export their profits.

This exposes the government’s priorities. It claims EU law makes rescue of Aughinish near impossible, yet it carved out a bespoke sanctions derogation to keep the plant open in 2022. It claims that a sovereign aluminium industry is unrealistic, yet it happily assigns the grid capacity that would make it viable to a trillion-dollar corporation. The barrier is not technical, legal, or financial. It is a political choice to serve corporate interests over workers and regions.

This proposal offers an alternative. It outlines the nationalisation of Aughinish, the rapid environmental clean-up of the site, the construction of a publicly owned green aluminium smelter, and the eventual transfer of both assets to a worker-owned cooperative. No public-private partnerships. No private equity. No extraction of wealth by capital. Just public investment, worker control, and regional stability. 

2. The Nationalisation of Aughinish Alumina

Step 1: Compulsory Acquisition as a Strategic National Asset

The Oireachtas should pass legislation designating the Aughinish Alumina complex and its associated port and residue infrastructure as a Strategic National Industrial Asset. Under this designation, the State will compulsorily acquire the plant from Rusal. Given the sanctions environment and the threat of forced closure, the acquisition price can be set at a nominal level €1 to €50 million reflecting the distressed nature of the asset and the significant environmental liabilities Rusal would otherwise leave behind.

Regardless of what might be claimed by the government with their favoured cop out of “EU says no” or “it has never been done” there is ample precedent (Please see “Precedents and legal foundations” at the end of this report) 

Step 2: Public Enterprise as Transitional Vehicle

A temporary state-owned enterprise, structured as a statutory corporation or a company held entirely by the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) on behalf of the people, will assume ownership. This entity let us call it “Alúmanam na Sionainne” will operate the refinery as a going concern, maintaining all existing employment, redirecting alumina exports to non-Russian European smelters (a commercially proven pathway), and preparing the plant for its ultimate transfer to worker ownership.

Step 3: Working Capital from the Public Purse

A working capital facility of €100–150 million, provided by the State as a loan from the Exchequer or the Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland (which exists to serve public policy objectives), will cover bauxite procurement, energy costs, and payroll during the commercial realignment. This is recoverable operating capital, not a subsidy. The refinery is a commercially viable asset once freed from a sanctioned parent company; it will generate the revenue to repay this facility in full.

Step 4: Cooperative Conversion:

The State’s ownership is temporary and transitional. Once the public investment has been fully recouped (see Section 5), ownership of Alúmanam na Sionainne will transfer in full to a newly constituted Aughinish Worker Cooperative. The workers will not be required to buy their shares with personal capital. Instead, a portion of annual operating surpluses will be retained in a cooperative conversion fund. As the State is repaid, equity transfers incrementally to the workforce as collective, inalienable ownership. No worker will own individual tradeable shares; ownership is collective and democratic, on the principle of one worker, one vote.

This model, public investment as midwife to worker ownership, is consistent with syndicalist principles. As well as avoiding any EU interference later. The State does not retain permanent control of industry. It acts as the workers’ banker and bridge, ensuring that essential infrastructure is not lost to market failure, and then withdraws, leaving the means of production in the hands of those who operate it.

3. Environmental Remediation as a Public Responsibility

The bauxite residue (red mud) disposal area adjacent to Aughinish is Ireland’s largest onshore industrial disaster in the making. Under private ownership, it has been a managed risk. Under state and then worker ownership, the situation can finally be fixed for once and for all, for the people as well as the environment. 

Immediate actions (0–3 years):

1. Commission an independent, EPA-supervised audit of the residue area to establish a detailed remediation roadmap.

2. Invest in dewatering, compression, and progressive re-vegetation to stabilise the site and reduce long-term risk.

3. Explore the re-processing of residue for critical minerals (rare earths, scandium), leveraging EU Critical Raw Materials funding and research partnerships with Irish universities. 

Funding:

The State will allocate an initial €50–100 million from the Exchequer to begin stabilisation work immediately. Full remediation over 15–20 years, estimated at €200–350 million, will be partly funded through EU programmes (Just Transition Fund, Critical Raw Materials Act, Horizon Europe) and partly from the refinery’s own operating surpluses, ensuring that the burden does not fall on the general taxpayer alone.

The alternative, waiting for Rusal to abandon an unfunded liability, would cost the State the same or more, with no productive asset in return. If Rusal is forced out due to sanctions do you really think they are going to pay for remediation? Remediation under public and worker control guarantees that it is done properly, transparently, and in the interest of the local community.

4. A Publicly Owned Green Aluminium Smelter

Ireland consumes approximately 120,000 tonnes of primary aluminium annually. All of it is imported, much of it smelted in coal-fired plants abroad. A nation that builds aircraft, cans beverages, and constructs homes with aluminium fixings should not be entirely dependent on volatile global markets for a critical metal.

The proposal:

Construct a new, publicly owned aluminium smelter on the Shannon Estuary, co-located with the Aughinish refinery. The smelter will be sized to consume 4.8 TWh of electricity annually, the balance of the 800 MW grid capacity currently being gifted to Amazon,  producing approximately 340,000 tonnes of primary aluminium per year. This comfortably exceeds domestic demand, allowing substantial export of green aluminium to European markets at a time of critical European demand. 

Capital cost and public financing:

A modern aluminium smelter costs approximately €4,500 per tonne of annual capacity. A 340,000-tonne plant requires an estimated €1.53 billion in capital. Under this proposal, every cent of that capital will come from public sources. No private investors. No public-private partnerships. No equity shares for funds.

The capital stack will comprise:

1. Direct Exchequer capital grant: €500–600 million, allocated as a strategic national investment.

2. Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) equity: ISIF’s mandate already permits investment in productive domestic assets that generate a commercial return and align with public policy. A further €400–500 million drawn from ISIF.

3. European Investment Bank and EU Critical Raw Materials loans: Long-dated, low-interest sovereign loans to the Irish State, totalling €400–500 million.

Total public capital mobilised: €1.3–1.6 billion, fully owned by the Irish people. There will be no private shareholders, no dividend leakage, and no pressure to extract short-term profit at the expense of wages, safety, or the environment.

Energy supply: public ownership of renewables:

The smelter requires a dedicated 1.3–1.5 GW offshore wind farm to provide stable, low-cost, zero-carbon electricity. This wind farm will be developed by a publicly owned Irish energy company, either Bord na Móna as with Amazon, a new State energy enterprise, or a municipal energy authority for the Mid-West. The capital cost of the wind farm (€3.5–4.5 billion) will be financed through the same public channels, but it must be understood that Ireland is obligated to build this renewable capacity regardless of the smelter. The smelter makes the wind farm economically viable by providing a guaranteed, long-term power purchase agreement. The two are symbiotic. The energy remains in public hands; the smelter pays a fair price that covers costs and funds reinvestment.

Timeline:

5–7 years from planning permission to first metal. During construction, the Aughinish refinery continues to operate, export alumina, and sustain its workforce.

5. Ownership Transfer to the Workers

Both the refinery and the smelter will ultimately be owned by the people who operate them. The cooperative conversion will follow a clear, legally binding schedule.

1. Year 1–5: The State-owned enterprise operates both facilities. Operating surpluses are allocated to: 1.1) repaying the working capital facility; 1.2) building the cooperative conversion fund; 1.3) reinvesting in plant and environmental improvements; 1.4) contributing to the local community through a statutory community dividend.

2. Year 6 onward: As the State recovers its initial investment ; estimated within 8–12 years of steady operation. ownership equity transfers incrementally to the United Shannon Aluminium Workers’ Cooperative. At the point of full repayment, the State retains zero ownership. The cooperative becomes the sole proprietor of the refinery, the smelter, and their associated assets.

3. Governance: The cooperative operates on the principle of one worker, one vote. A general assembly of worker-members elects a management board. A technical and commercial executive is appointed by and accountable to the board. Surpluses are distributed according to democratic decision: wage increases, collective social funds, reinvestment, or price reductions for downstream Irish fabricators.

This is a practical, financed, and legally achievable pathway to worker control of a strategic industry.

6. Summary of Costs and Economic Returns

Total public investment required (one-off capital):

Aquisition of Aughanish (Distressed)

1-50 million 

Working Capital Facility

100 -150 million

Initial Environmental Stabilisation 

50 - 100 million 

Smelter CAPEX 

1.3 - 1.6 billion

Total Public Capital Mobilised

1.45 - 1.9 billion 

All of which is recoverable through operating surpluses. 

Note: The offshore wind farm capital is excluded as it is infrastructure Ireland must build under climate obligations. The smelter is the anchor that makes that infrastructure financeable.

Annual economic return (steady state, both plants):

Metric Value

Direct Industrial Jobs (Refinery & Smelter)

1500 jobs 

Indirect and induced jobs (Mid-West)

3,000–3,500

Total employment supported

4,500–5,000

Annual direct wage bill

€150–180 million

Annual export revenue (alumina & aluminium)

€1.5-€1.8 Billion

Import substitution (domestic aluminium)

€300 million

Annual GVA retained in Ireland

€1 Billion

Profit destination Repayment of State, then worker cooperative

No private leakage, strategic investment with return to the exchequer if kept nationalised, boost to local economy & money circulation if cooperativised later. 

Shannon Foynes Port viability

Secured

Strategic critical raw material autonomy 

Achieved

Comparison with the cost of doing nothing:

Aughinish’s closure would conservatively cost the State over €1.2 billion across two decades in social welfare, lost tax revenue, local authority rates collapse, port decline, and unfunded environmental remediation. The net new public investment required under this proposal is of a similar magnitude — but it buys a productive, job-rich, publicly owned industrial base & the potential for serious return on investment rather than a managed decline.

7. The Political Principle

This proposal demonstrates that the obstacles to rescuing Aughinish, building a smelter, and transferring ownership to workers are not technical, legal, or financial. They are political. 

• The State has proven it can negotiate EU law creatively when it suits its interests:  The sanctions derogation for Aughinish in 2022 is Exhibit A. 

• It has proven it can allocate enormous energy resources to corporate projects: the 800 MW reserved for Amazon is Exhibit B.

If the State can gift 6 TWh of Ireland’s electricity to a foreign corporation, it can use that same energy for a publicly owned industry that serves the common good. If it can fight Brussels for a sanctions carve-out to protect Limerick jobs, it can fight Brussels to protect those same jobs with a state-led rescue.

And if it can do all that for a region and a workforce it claims to value, then its claim that the Occupied Territories Bill is an “impossible” breach of EU trade law is exposed as a politically convenient evasion. The same creative legal energy, the same willingness to bear diplomatic cost, the same assertion of national sovereignty over economic decision-making, all are available. The government simply refuses to deploy them for the people of Palestine, just as it currently refuses to deploy them for the workers of the Shannon Estuary.

This proposal is not a plea. It is a demand, grounded in real pragmatic economics and syndicalist principles:

• Public ownership of strategic industries.

• No private profit extraction.

• Worker control as the end goal.

•  Regions and workers before corporations.

The resources exist. The legal pathways exist. The only missing element is a government willing to set aside purity to their failing ideology & use them.

Precedents & legal foundations: 

1. State Acquisition of Sanctioned or Distressed Strategic Assets

A. Germany: Gazprom Germania (now SEFE)

In April 2022, Gazprom Germania, a critical energy infrastructure company operating gas storage, trading, and supply across Germany and Europe was abandoned by its Russian state-owned parent under sanctions pressure. The company faced imminent insolvency and collapse of gas supply contracts.

The Intervention: The German government placed the company under trusteeship of the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), then compulsorily nationalised it at zero cost in November 2022. The legal basis was the amended Energy Security Act, which allowed the state to take over operators of critical infrastructure “if there is a risk that they will no longer be able to fulfil their tasks and a disruption to the security of supply is imminent.”

The cost: The German state injected approximately €13.8 billion in equity and loan guarantees to stabilise the company, secure alternative gas supplies, and maintain European energy contracts. This was a massive upfront public commitment, far exceeding what Aughinish would require,  but was deemed essential to prevent a systemic collapse.

The result: The company, renamed Securing Energy for Europe (SEFE), continues to operate under public ownership. The German government has stated it will maintain control for as long as necessary and has not ruled out retaining permanent public ownership. Crucially, no private investors were required. The state acted as owner of last resort, leveraging EU state-aid approval granted on the grounds of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU; a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State.

Relevance to Aughinish: This is the closest parallel available. A Russian-owned strategic industrial asset threatened by sanctions, abandoned or rendered unviable, rescued by the state through compulsory acquisition, kept running as a going concern, with all workers retained. The EU Commission approved the nationalisation under the same state-aid rules Ireland would invoke. The only difference is that Germany’s asset was energy infrastructure; Aughinish is a critical raw material infrastructure. The legal and economic basis is identical.

Citable source: German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, press release, 14 November 2022; European Commission State Aid Decision SA.104606 (2022/N).

B. Italy: Lukoil ISAB Refinery (Sicily)

The ISAB refinery in Priolo, Sicily, one of Europe’s largest,  was owned by a Swiss-based subsidiary of Russia’s Lukoil. EU sanctions on Russian crude oil imports threatened to paralyse the plant, which employed over 3,000 workers and supplied a significant share of Italy’s fuel.

The intervention: The Italian government placed the refinery under temporary state trusteeship in late 2022, effectively nationalising its operation while a non-Russian buyer was sought. The state guaranteed the continuation of crude supply and payroll, using emergency legislation to bypass normal procedures. The plant was subsequently sold to GOI Energy (a Cyprus-based fund backed by Trafigura) in 2023, but only after the state had stabilised operations and secured the workforce. The Italian government explicitly argued that the social and economic cost of inaction was unacceptable, and that EU sanctions provided a legal framework for emergency state intervention.

Relevance to Aughanish: Shows that EU member states can and do use emergency powers to take control of distressed, sanctions-hit industrial plants, running them while restructuring. The state does not need to be the permanent owner; it acts as a bridge. The Aughinish proposal follows this model, but with a worker-owned destination rather than a private sale.

Citable source: Reuters, “Italy takes temporary control of Lukoil refinery,” 1 December 2022; Italian Law Decree 187/2022 (converted into Law 8/2023).

C. France: EDF Full Nationalisation

 Électricité de France, the country’s nuclear and hydropower giant, was already 84% state-owned, but the minority private shareholding was causing volatility and speculation. A planned nuclear renaissance required full state control to execute long-term strategic investment without market pressure.

The Intervention: In 2022–2023, the French government launched a full nationalisation, buying out the remaining shares for approximately €9.7 billion. The rationale was strategic autonomy and the ability to plan energy infrastructure over decades, free from short-term shareholder demands. The state assumed complete ownership.

Relevance to Aughanish: Demonstrates that in advanced EU economies, full public ownership of large-scale industrial assets is not only legal but is actively pursued when the asset is considered strategically essential. Aluminium is now classified as a Critical Raw Material by the EU; the same strategic need applies to a sovereign smelter as to nuclear electricity.

Citable source: Agence des participations de l'État, “Nationalisation d’EDF,” June 2023; European Commission approval under Merger Regulation, case M.10854.

D. Netherlands: Temporary Public Ownership of Energy Infrastructure

During the 2022–2023 energy crisis, the Dutch government repeatedly intervened in energy companies and infrastructure, including placing price caps and considering public ownership options for strategic gas storage and grid assets. While less dramatic than the German case, it further normalised the idea that the state can and must step in when private or foreign-owned entities cannot fulfil essential economic functions.

2. State-to-Worker Cooperative Conversions and Public Buyout Support

A. Italy: The Marcora Law and Worker Buyouts

Italy has the most developed state-supported worker-buyout framework in Europe. The Marcora Law (1985, updated 2022) establishes a revolving fund (Fondo di Mutualità per la MMI) that provides capital to workers who wish to buy out a failing or closing company and convert it into a cooperative. The State does not retain ownership; it provides the financial bridge.

How it works:

• Workers facing redundancy pool their unemployment benefits as initial capital.

• The State matches or supplements this capital through a dedicated fund.

• The fund takes a temporary equity stake or provides a loan, which the cooperative repays over time from operating profits.

• Once repaid, full ownership rests with the worker-members.

Results: Over 350 worker buyouts have been completed since 1985, saving tens of thousands of jobs across manufacturing, services, and agriculture. Recent high-profile examples include Ri-Maflow (a former automotive plant converted to recycling), Greslab (ceramics), and various engineering cooperatives in Emilia-Romagna.

Relevance: This is the exact mechanism this proposal envisions. The State provides the upfront capital; the workers repay from surpluses; ownership transfers collectively. Italy’s 40-year track record demonstrates it is legally, financially, and practically sustainable. Ireland could legislate its own Marcora-style framework specifically for Aughinish and the smelter, using ISIF as the funding vehicle.

Citable source: CFI (Cooperazione Finanza Impresa), annual reports on Marcora-funded buyouts; European Commission, “Cooperatives and Social Economy,” 2021; Italian Law No. 49/1985 (Marcora) and subsequent amendments.

B. France: Duralex Worker Cooperative (2024)

Duralex, the iconic French tempered-glass manufacturer, faced bankruptcy in 2024 after a series of private equity owners ran the company into the ground. 230 jobs were at risk.

The intervention: Workers occupied the plant and demanded a cooperative takeover. The French state, through the commercial court and regional authorities, backed the conversion. A workers’ cooperative (SCOP – Société Coopérative Ouvrière de Production) was formed, and the state provided loans, grants, and a temporary public holding structure. The cooperative now owns and operates the company.

Relevance to Aughanish: A recent, high-profile case in a core EU country. It demonstrates that when workers organise and the state is willing, a direct transition from failing private ownership to successful worker cooperative is possible even in energy-intensive manufacturing. The French government made a political choice to support workers over liquidators.

Citable source: Le Monde, “Duralex: la coopérative ouvrière prend les commandes,” 26 July 2024; French government press release, Ministry of Industry, July 2024.

C. Spain: Mondragon Corporation (Foundational Model)

While Mondragon did not originate from a state buyout, it is the global leader of large-scale worker cooperative industrial enterprise, with over 70,000 worker-owners and annual revenues of over €12 billion across manufacturing, finance, retail, and knowledge sectors. It operates its own bank (Caja Laboral) and social security system. Crucially, Mondragon demonstrates that worker cooperatives can compete globally in capital-intensive, heavy-industrial sectors (including automotive components, machine tools, and white goods) without private shareholders. The model is scalable and durable. Any Irish worker cooperative for aluminium production can draw directly on Mondragon’s legal, financial, and governance structures.

Citable source: Mondragon Corporation, Annual Report 2023; academic literature on cooperative governance, e.g., “The Mondragon Cooperative Experience,” Harvard Business School case study.

3. Sovereign Smelter Building and Aluminium as Critical Infrastructure

A. Iceland: ISAL Smelter (Original State Construction)

The ISAL aluminium smelter in Straumsvík (now operated by Rio Tinto) was originally built by the Icelandic state in 1969, in partnership with Swiss Aluminium. The state invested public capital, provided the energy infrastructure (hydropower), and retained significant ownership for decades. The smelter is the anchor industry that justified the development of Iceland’s hydroelectric resources,  exactly the symbiotic relationship this proposal envisions between an Irish smelter and offshore wind. Iceland’s economy transformed on the back of this public-led industrial investment.

Relevance: A sovereign nation with no prior aluminium industry built a smelter with public capital and energy infrastructure, creating a new industrial sector that sustained high-wage employment for generations. Ireland can do the same.

Citable source: Landsvirkjun (Icelandic National Power Company), historical project documents; “Industrial Development in Iceland: The Aluminium Smelter in Straumsvík,” Scandinavian Economic History Review.

B. EU Critical Raw Materials Act (2024) and Strategic Funding

The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, adopted in 2024, identifies aluminium (including alumina and primary metal) as a Strategic Raw Material. It sets targets for domestic extraction (10%), processing (40%), and recycling (25%) by 2030. The Act provides for:

• Streamlined permitting for strategic projects.

• Access to public funding through the European Investment Bank and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Fund.

•  Designation of Strategic Projects, which benefit from priority status and state-aid flexibility.

An Aughinish rescue plus a new green smelter would almost certainly qualify as a Strategic Project under the Act. This opens significant EU co-funding streams, further reducing the cost to the Irish Exchequer.

Citable source: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials.

4. State-Led Environmental Remediation of Abandoned Industrial Sites

A. United States: Superfund Programme

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, 1980), known as Superfund, empowers the US federal government to directly remediate contaminated industrial sites when the responsible party is bankrupt, absent, or unable to act. The government carries out the clean-up and recovers costs where possible. Thousands of sites have been cleaned up, and many have been repurposed for industrial or community use.

Relevance: The State taking on environmental remediation of the red mud site at Aughinish is not exceptional; it is standard practice in advanced economies when private owners cannot or will not act. The alternative; leaving the waste in place under an owner that has abandoned it, is far riskier and costlier.

Citable source: US Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund Annual Report 2023.

B. Germany: Wismut Uranium Mine Remediation

After German reunification, the massive Soviet-era uranium mining operations in East Germany (Wismut) left a toxic legacy. The German federal government took full financial and operational responsibility, creating a dedicated state-owned company (Wismut GmbH) to clean up the sites. The programme cost €8 billion and ran for decades, but it successfully stabilised the contamination and protected communities.

Relevance: Demonstrates what can be done when a state has the willingness and capacity to take over disastrous industrial legacies and manage them for the public good within EU law & when not rigidly tied to Neoliberal ideology without exceptions . The red mud site is smaller in scale but follows the same principle.

Citable source: Wismut GmbH, annual reports; German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy documentation.